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There has been much debate in recent years about whether the Federal Reserve should have taken 
action against the housing-price bubble as it was forming. One argument in favor of using monetary 
policy to offset asset-price bubbles is that it may be impossible after the bubble bursts to ease policy 
hard enough or fast enough to offset a strong contraction. While the fall in housing prices since 2006 
has clearly increased unemployment and depressed growth, much less is known about how the costs 
have been distributed across households of different means. This paper uses data from the Census 
Bureau’s annual American Community Survey (ACS) to examine this question. We first lay out the 
mechanisms via which a housing-market bust would be expected to affect households, in terms of 
incomes, employment, assets, and ability to service debt. We then use the ACS data to analyze how 
the house-price bust has affected households with different characteristics, differentiating between 
communities in which home prices did and did not boom and bust. Our results suggest that costs of the 
bubble have tended to fall on households less able to endure periods of financial distress. This lends 
further support to the argument that monetary policy oriented to social welfare should tackle bubbles 
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Introduction 
There has been much debate in recent years about whether the Federal Reserve should have taken 
action against the housing-price bubble as it was forming. As home prices rose, the Fed’s position was 
that it was difficult to know whether a bubble was developing, and that monetary policy could always 
be eased if declining prices posed risks to continued expansion.
1 As much as it is now widely recognized 
that this was not a prudent position,
2 there remains little consensus as to whether monetary policy 
should incorporate any systematic concern with asset-price bubbles, above and beyond what is  implied 
by its core concerns with inflation and unemployment. Thus, for example, pro-cyclical adjustments in 
capital requirements could be used to keep asset values from drifting out of line with their underlying 
values (Yellen 2009, Evans 2009).  
An important issue in this respect concerns who pays the price when an asset-price bubble bursts. 
Conceivably it may be of little social benefit to offset a potential bubble which, if it later burst, would 
impose costs on a relatively narrow and well-off segment of the population. Thus, for example, the 
high-tech stock bubble of the late 1990s affected shareholders and employees of high-tech companies, 
who were largely highly skilled and well-educated. In contrast, the housing-price bubble that burst in 
2006 and precipitated an aggregate downturn imposed costs on a wide swath of the households and 
businesses -– although we know little as yet about how these were distributed. Characterizing the 
distributional effects of housing-price booms and busts is important in view of recent theoretical work 
on business cycles, which suggests that allowing for heterogeneities may significantly alter estimated 
welfare effects of aggregate fluctuations.
3 
To date, there has been little systematic research on the distribution of benefits and costs of housing-
price bubbles. In an early paper, Case and Cook (1988) found that rising home prices increased the 
consumption opportunities of existing homeowners while decreasing those of renters and prospective 
homebuyers; much research since then confirms this finding (e.g. Gyourko and Tracy 1999). Mayer 
(1993) found that prices of lower-end housing tend to increase more rapidly during housing booms than 
those of higher-end housing, but that the volatility of higher-end housing is greater. Quigley and 
Raphael (2001) identify high housing costs as a significant determinant of variations in homelessness 
across areas, suggesting that housing-price bubbles contribute to problems of access to housing for very 
low income people. Work by Baker and Rosnick (2008) using the Survey of Consumer Finances suggests 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. Bernanke (2002), Rudebusch (2005), Lansing (2005), Kohn (2008), Mishkin (2008). 
2 In the words of San Francisco Federal Reserve President Janet Yellen (2009), it is now “patently 
obvious … that not dealing with certain kinds of bubbles before they get big can have grave 
consequences.”  
3 Notably, see Krusell, Mukoyama, Sahin, and Smith (2009), and also Barlevy (2004) and Imrohoroglu 
(2008). 
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that the current drop in housing prices is particularly detrimental for households in the middle of the 
wealth distribution, given the importance of home equity in their portfolios. A shortcoming of existing 
research is that it tends to focus on housing-related issues without considering aggregate implications. 
Notably, rising house prices per se may be detrimental for low-to-moderate income households, but if 
they stimulate residential investment and/or boost consumer spending due to wealth effects, they may 
also improve prospects for income and employment. Thus, understanding how housing-price bubbles 
affect income and employment patterns, as well as housing-related outcomes, is beneficial for gauging 
how their costs and benefits are distributed across groups within the population.  
This paper uses data from the Census Bureau’s annual American Community Survey (ACS) to examine 
this question. Each year, the ACS collects social, demographic, housing and economic information from 
a nationally representative sample of 3 million U.S. households. Presently data are available for 2005-
2008, enabling us to examine how the bursting of the housing price bubble after 2006 has affected 
households with varying characteristics. The next section of the paper lays out three mechanisms via 
which housing-market booms and busts affect the broader economy and different types of households 
within it: namely, wealth-effects on spending, swings in residential investment, and problems of 
financial distress. We then use data from the 2005-2008 waves of the ACS to analyze how the housing-
price bust has affected households with different characteristics, differentiating between communities 
in which home prices did and did not boom and bust. Our results suggest that costs of the bubble have 
tended to fall on households less able to endure periods of financial distress. This lends further support 
to the argument that monetary policy oriented to social welfare should tackle bubbles ex ante rather 
than ex post. 
 
 
Conceptual issues and existing research 
Case and Quigley (2008) identify three mechanisms via which the unwinding of a housing boom would 
be expected to affect the broader economy. The first is the wealth effect on spending, whereby a 
decline in home prices reduces the net worth of homeowners, causing them to reduce their spending to 
reflect the lower value of their total wealth. Research by Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), Carroll, 
Otsuka and Slacalek (2006), and Bostic, Gabriel and Painter (2009) suggests that, ceteris paribus, a $1 
increase in housing wealth would boost spending by 4-8 cents, with the effect phasing in over the next 
2 or 3 years. Estimates of the housing-wealth effect are stronger than those for stock-market wealth, 
which range between 2-5 cents per dollar, due to the greater prevalence of homeownership versus 
stockownership and a higher marginal propensity to consume among homeowners versus stockholders.
4 
At the same time, higher home prices also boost the housing costs of renters, cutting into their ability 
                                                 
4 It is also likely that the housing-wealth effect has strengthened over time due to greater opportunities 
to cash out gains in home equity via mortgage refinancing (Muellbauer 2008). - 4 -  
 
to spend on other goods.
5 Nonetheless, because 66% of households are owner-occupied and home-
owning households account for 77% of total consumer spending, the housing-wealth effect is estimated 
to be positive and strong on balance.
6  
 
Via this mechanism, the bursting of the housing-price bubble would be expected to slow growth of 
consumer spending and exert a drag on output, incomes and employment over the next few years. To 
provide a sense of the magnitude of the effect, we can use Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek’s (2006) 
estimates of a same-quarter wealth effect of 2 cents per dollar that increases to 8 cents per dollar 
after two years and data on the declining value of housing wealth from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Funds (see Appendix Table 1). Based on the extent of the decline in housing wealth and its time 
profile, we estimate that it had reduced real consumption growth by 1/2 of a percentage point by 
2006:Q4, 1-1/2 percentage points by 2007:Q4, and 2 percentage points by 2008:Q4.
7  How this would 
affect employment and incomes among people of differing characteristics is not clear from existing 
research. To the extent that the reduction in spending follows the usual pattern in cyclical downturns, 
it would be expected to disproportionally affect spending on durable goods, as well as spending on 
discretionary goods and services (e.g. recreational travel, restaurant meals, fashion clothing).
8 It would 
also be expected to lead to higher unemployment, with people having less education and/or who are 
black or Hispanic experiencing the largest increases in unemployment rates (Blank 1989, Hoynes 2000, 
Spriggs and Williams 2000). Geographically, adverse wealth-effects on spending may tend to be 
somewhat larger in areas that experienced house-price bubbles due to declining demand for locally-
produced goods and services. On the other hand, the decline in housing prices would be expected to 
reduce upward pressures on rents in areas that had had bubbles, making housing more affordable for 
renters.   
 
The second mechanism via which an unwinding housing boom would affect the broader economy is 
declining residential investment. Periods of unusual run-ups in prices tend to be associated with booms 
in residential investment, which in turn raise incomes and employment -- both because of the 
construction activity itself and because of relatively high multiplier effects associated with residential 
                                                 
5 Earlier research by Sheiner (1995) and Englehart (1996) found some evidence that higher home prices 
could reduce spending by prospective homeowners, due to the need to save for a down-payment. This 
offset has likely become less important in the past decade, as down-payment requirements slipped. 
6 Authors’ computations from the 2008 Consumer Expenditure Survey.  
7 Note that Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek’s estimates of the wealth effect are on the high side. Case and 
Quigley (2008) argue that there is an asymmetry in the housing-wealth effect, such that a given decline 
in housing wealth may reduce spending by less than a comparable increase boosts it.  
8 Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Bostic, Gabriel and Painter (2009) find that 
changes in housing wealth especially increase spending on non-durable goods. Note that, whereas their 
study aimed to characterize effects of wealth on consumption, ours is in its effects on production and 
employment; given the differential importance of imports across categories of goods, it is not clear 
that higher spending on nondurable goods necessarily means higher domestic production of them. - 5 -  
 
investment (Fair 2004, Case and Quigley 2008). Thus, Case and Quigley (2008) expected a marked 
decline in the pace of new home construction to represent the largest effect of the housing-price bust 
on the broader economy, and indeed data from the National Income and Product Accounts show that it 
was a major factor pulling down growth of real GDP growth in 2007 and 2008.
9  
 
Whether we should expect declining construction investment and employment to be worst in areas that 
had the most sizable housing-price bubbles is not clear from existing research. Several previous studies 
suggest that housing-price bubbles are most likely to build in areas where land is scarce, so that 
increased demand pushes up price rather than eliciting increased supply of new homes (Glaeser, 
Gyourko, and Saiz 2008). In this case, it is possible that adverse effects on employment and incomes 
may not be concentrated in areas that had the worst housing-price bubbles, as these may not have 
experienced particularly strong booms in investment (Goodman
, and Thibodeau 2008). In terms of what 
types of people would be most affected by a construction slump, it is important to note that the 
construction industry employs people with varied levels of education, training, skill, and experience -- 
ranging from construction laborers (12-13% of the construction work force in 2005), to skilled craftsman 
like carpenters, electricians and masons (40%), to office and administrative support staff (14%), to 
construction managers (who earned $91,000 per year on average and made up 7.5% of the work force in 
2005).
10 But to the extent that the least skilled workers and/or minorities are the first to be laid off 
when construction business turns down, declining residential investment may also have regressive 
effects on incomes and employment. We can also expect declining construction to adversely affect 
production and distribution of building materials and supplies, so that its effects may not be confined 
to markets that had had construction booms.  
 
The third channel via which a decline in housing prices affects the broader economy is financial. 
Because home sales tend to boom during housing-price bubbles, people shift out of jobs in other 
sectors and occupations and into jobs in real estate and finance (Hsieh and Moretti 2003). As prices fall 
and sales drop off, incomes and employment in real estate and finance decline; given that jobs in 
these fields require relatively high levels of education and/or training, job loss here may affect people 
in the middle-to-upper part of the income distribution. Additionally, because returns to 
homeownership seem so high during bubbles, and costs of waiting to buy rise, households that might 
otherwise rent may instead buy via leverage, taking on debt payments that are high relative to their 
incomes. Especially for households who bought late in the boom, a subsequent price drop can leave 
them holding an asset worth less than the debt associated with it, with little free cash-flow to spare. 
                                                 
9 Whereas residential investment had been adding ½ a percentage point to growth of real GDP in 2003 
and 2004, in 2007 and 2008 its contraction pulled GDP growth down by more than 1 percentage point. 
Figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.5.2, as of 
December 15, 200.  
10 Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics, 2005-2008. - 6 -  
 
This problem was much exacerbated by growth of subprime lending in the past 10-15 years, where the 
availability of low- or no-downpayment loans increased the likelihood of going ‘underwater’ when 
housing prices turned down, and mortgage payments on a non-negligible share of subprime loans were 
re-setting to higher levels just as housing prices peaked (Gramlich 2007). Thus, rather than being able 
to sell their homes to pay off their mortgages, homeowners instead suspended payments and/or 
defaulted on their loans. We know from financial data that defaults and foreclosures have increased 
significantly since 2007, especially in markets where subprime lending had grown most robustly; we 
also know that subprime lending tended to grow most rapidly in areas that had relatively large black 
and Hispanic populations (Mayer and Pence 2008). Still, the evidence is less than clear on what types of 
households have had to exit from financially unsustainable homeownership arrangements: because the 
financial data contain little information on household characteristics, we know only generally what 





Data for this study come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, an annual cross-
section survey which collects social, demographic, housing and economic information from a large 
sample of U.S. households. The survey is intended to measure changes between the decennial censuses 
and uses a questionnaire similar to its former ‘long form’. As with the census, filling it out and 
returning it is required by law.  About 250,000 households per month receive the questionnaire in the 
mail, yielding a sample size of about 3 million households per year (a 1 in 40 sample).
11 The ACS sample 
has been broadly representative geographically since 2005, with data presently available for the four 
waves between 2005 and 2008.
12 However, because relatively small areas have relatively small 
numbers of respondents, estimates of changes over time for such areas, especially for subsets of 
households within them, move a good deal due to sampling error. Thus, we confine our analysis to the 
167 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that had populations of 250,000 or more in the 2005-08 
period. These contain about 220 million people, or about three-quarters of the U.S. population.
13  
 
To measure how the housing-market bust has affected households with different characteristics, we 
categorize metropolitan areas into those which experienced a boom and bust in housing prices, and 
those which did not. For this purpose, we use the quarterly all-transaction house-price indexes from 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which are weighted, repeat-sales indexes computed for 
                                                 
11 The ACS makes numerous efforts to contact respondents who do not initially reply, resulting in 
eventual response rates of 97-98%. 
12 In 2001-2004, the ACS sample included 800,000 households and was intended to represent areas with 
populations of 1 million or more. In 2005, the sample size was increased to 3 million households, with 
the intention of representing areas with populations of 65,000 or more.  
13 The analysis also excludes data for Puerto Rico.  - 7 -  
 
single-family properties having a mortgage purchased by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. While the FHFA 
data have certain disadvantages relative to the S&P/Case-Shiller home-price indexes, the former are 
available for all of the MSAs in our analysis while the latter are not. To identify MSAs that experienced 
housing-price bubbles that burst, we use two definitions based on the extent of the increase in the 
FHFA price index between 1995:Q1 and the peak value shown in the data, and the extent of the 
decline in the price index (if any) between the peak and 2008:Q4. In the first ‘broader’ definition, an 
MSA is considered to have had a bubble if prices increased by at least 125% after 1995 and decreased 
from the peak by least 10% by 2008:Q4. In second ‘narrow’ definition, the price had to have risen by 
150% or more after 1995, and decreased from the peak by 25% or more by 2008:Q4.
14  
 
As shown in Table 1, 36 of the 167 MSAs experienced a burst bubble under the broader definition, while 
23 had a burst bubble of the narrow type.
15 MSAs meeting the narrow definition are all found in 
California, Florida, and Nevada; MSAs added in under the broader definition are also found in these 
states, as well as Arizona, Massachusetts, and the Washington, DC, metropolitan area (see Appendix 
Table 2 for the list). There is of course no assurance that our definitions capture the concept of a 
bubble as a period when market prices diverged significantly from prices implied by the underlying 
value of housing services (see e.g. Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai, 2005, for discussion). But given the 
amplitudes of the upswings and downswings in the data, we expect that our definition does a 
reasonably good job of identifying metropolitan areas where a bubble in this sense occurred.  
 
In what follows, we compare changes in various measures of housing, incomes, employment, inequality 
and poverty across bubble and non-bubble markets. To understand how declining home prices have 
affected households with varying characteristics, we use education as a proxy for permanent income, 
differentiating between households where the householder had not completed a high school diploma, 
had completed a high school diploma but not a college degree, or had completed a college degree.
16 
We also analyze differences across households by race/ethnicity, given their well-known correlations 
with economic outcomes and opportunities. In particular, we differentiate between households where 
the householder is white and does not self-identify as Hispanic; those where the householder self-
                                                 
14 Appendix Figure 1 shows the clear negative correlation between the extent of the run-up in home 
prices after 1995 and the extent of decline thereafter. Note that, for the 11 largest MSAs, the FHFA 
provides data for metropolitan divisions within the MSA rather than the MSA itself. In these cases, we 
computed price changes for the MSA as population-weighted averages of changes for the metropolitan 
divisions. Note that, in any event, all divisions within a given MSA had the same categorization in 9 of 
the 11 cases. 
15 See the Appendix for details. 
16 In the Census definition, the ‘householder’ is the person (or one of the persons) in whose name the 
housing unit is owned or rented. If a married couple owns the home jointly, either spouse may be the 
householder. People who undertook some college studies without completing a degree are included 
with high-school graduates.  - 8 -  
 
identifies as Hispanic; and those who classify their race as black.
17 Note that these categories are not 
mutually exclusive as people of Hispanic origin may be of any race.  
 
The present version of the paper presents a descriptive analysis of MSA-level data. Thus, for example, 
for given a given measure xit related to a housing, income, or employment outcome, where i is the 
metropolitan area and t is the survey wave, we calculate changes in the mean and median values of xit 
among ‘bubble’ and other metros, and test whether the difference between the two is significant.
18 To 
avoid losing information by focusing on scalar measures of changes over time, we also use box plots to 
show how distributions of given variables have changed over the 2005-2008 period in bubble versus 
other metros -- where the line in the middle of the box shows the median, the bottom and top of the 
box show the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of the distribution respectively, the ends of the whiskers show 
the 5
th and 95
th percentiles, and dots show extreme values beyond these points. An ongoing companion 
paper uses the household- and individual-level ACS data to examine effects of the housing-price bust in 
a multivariate framework.  
 
Housing wealth and housing costs 
Case and Quigley (2008: 164) argue that housing-market busts always begin with a decline in housing 
demand, and that is indeed what the ACS data show. As can be seen in Figure 1, growth in the number 
of housing units decelerated between 2006 and 2008 in both regular and bubble MSAs, with the decline 
especially pronounced in bubble MSAs. Whereas growth in the number of occupied units held roughly 
steady in regular MSAs, it fell significantly in bubble MSAs after 2006. This deceleration likely reflected 
a slower pace of household formation and postponed transitions into new or better homes, more than 
departures from unsustainable homeownership arrangements; thus, for example, the share of  
households living in the same house as they had one year earlier rose significantly after 2006 in bubble 
metros.
19 With demand for housing falling and supply continuing to rise, vacancy rates rose in both 
bubble metros and others, although by more in bubble metros than elsewhere. 
While the ACS does not collect data on housing wealth specifically, it does collect data on its key 
components. As shown in Figure 2, in the typical (median) ‘bubble’ metro, the median home price fell 
                                                 
17 The householder is considered to be Hispanic if he/she answers ‘yes’ to the question, “Is this person 
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?” He/she is considered to be black if he/she checks the option “Black/African 
Am./Negro” in response to the question, “What is this person’s race?” A person is considered to be 
non-Hispanic white if he/she checked “White” in response to the question, “What is this person’s 
race?” and checked “No, not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino” in response to the question, “Is this person 
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?” See Grieco and Cassidy (2001).  
18 Detailed tables showing hypothesis tests will be included as an appendix in a subsequent version of 
the paper. The discussion that follows emphasizes changes that are statistically significant.  
19 This result is consistent with research using two decades of data from the American Housing Survey 
by Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2008), who find that, on balance, negative equity tends to reduce 
household mobility rather than increase it.  - 9 -  
 
from a peak of $329,000 in 2006 to $275,800 in 2008 -– a drop of 16%. (All dollar values for the ACS 
survey data are expressed in constant 2008 prices). In contrast, in the typical regular metro, the 
median home price slipped from its peak of $156,900 in 2007 to $154,900 in 2008 –- a 1.3% decline.
20 
The ACS does not ask homeowners about their mortgage balances, but they are asked whether they 
have a mortgage outstanding. As the results show, homeowners in bubble MSAs are more leveraged 
than homeowners elsewhere, but in both cases these shares held fairly steady over this period. Thus, in 
bubble metros, the decline in home values is likely to have pulled down home equity significantly, 
without much change elsewhere.  
The ACS data provide some evidence that house-price swings are somewhat wider at the lower end of 
the distribution of home prices. As can be seen in the bottom row of Figure 2, whereas the median 
home price in the typical bubble metro declined by 16% between 2006 and 2008, the home price at the 
25
th percentile fell by 19% while that at the 75
th percentile came down by 14%. This is qualitatively 
similar to what is found in the ‘tiered’ S&P/Case-Shiller indexes, although their data show larger 
spreads between low- and high-tier homes.
21 Especially given that home equity represents a large share 
of the net worth of homeowners of more moderate means (see e.g. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2000, 
Starr 2009), the larger percentage decline in home prices at the lower end of the distribution implies a 
larger proportional decline in wealth for these homeowners compared to those owning higher-priced 
homes.  
Concerning the idea that a housing-price bust hurts homeowners but helps renters, the ACS data as of 
2008 do not show evidence of this. As shown in Figure 3, the share of renters having housing costs 
above 30% of their income held steady in both bubble and non-bubble markets, at around 50% in the 
former and 44% in the latter, in spite of rising vacancy rates in both places. This may be due in part to 
staggered adjustment of rental contracts and/or downwardly-rigid nominal rents, such that rental costs 
tend not to decline much despite rising vacancy rates (Genesove 2003). It may also reflect some 
tendency for renters to shift to better-quality rental properties when the housing market weakens: 
thus, for example, in bubble markets, the median number of rooms for renting households increased 
from 4.1 to 4.3 between 2005 and 2008. 
On the other hand, the ACS data also show a sizable and significant increase in the share of 
homeowners paying more than 30% of their incomes in housing costs: while this share held steady 
                                                 
20 Note that, unlike the FHFA data, home prices in the ACS are self-reported, include both single-family 
homes and other types of property, and are not repeat sales measures. Goodman and Ittner (1992) find 
that self-reported prices generally correspond reasonably well to commercial valuations of property. It 
is possible that accuracy is lower in periods when prices are changing unusually.  
21 For example, the median decline-from-peak for the 20 metropolitan areas covered in the S&P/Case-
Shiller data was 37.4% for low-tier homes versus 19.4% for high-tier homes through the end of 2008.  - 10 -  
 
around 27% in regular MSAs, it rose from 33% in 2006 to 40% in 2008 in those which had bubbles. This 
may reflect a greater prevalence of subprime and/or adjustable-rate mortgages in bubble metros.
22 
Many subprime loans started with two or three years of very low payments, followed by a steep 
increase to a new level based on the prevailing market rate. Whereas the interest rate on a 30-year 
conventional mortgage had hovered around 5.75% from mid-2003 to August 2005, it moved up to 6.75% 
over the following year then fluctuated around a higher level.
23 While causes of this rise in the share of 
homeowners with relatively high housing costs can be investigated further, the ACS data certainly 
suggest that the financial vulnerability of homeowners in bubble markets had risen just as home prices 
were turning.  
Employment and unemployment 
As discussed above, widespread house-price busts would be expected to reduce employment growth in 
both bubble and other MSAs due to the wealth effect. Yet bubble metros face extra contractionary 
pressures due to declining residential investment, declining real estate and financial activity related to 
housing sales, and declining spending on locally produced goods and services. The ACS data largely 
confirm this expectation. As shown in Figure 4, in the typical bubble MSA, employment growth fell from 
5% in 2005-06 to virtually zero in 2006-07, while it fell from about 4% to 1% elsewhere. Employment 
growth picked back up to 2.8% in ‘other’ MSAs in 2007-08, but rose only to 1.1% in bubble MSAs. The 
drag on job growth in bubble MSAs indeed came from loss of jobs in construction and finance, 
insurance, and real estate (FIRE). While construction employment had been growing vigorously in both 
bubble and other MSAs in 2005-06, in bubble MSAs, the level of employment dropped absolutely by 4.3% 
in 2006-2007 and fell again by 9.2% in 2007-08. In contrast, in other MSAs, construction employment 
stopped growing in 2006-08 but did not actually decline. The pattern of changes is identical for FIRE 
employment, although the magnitudes of declines in bubble MSAs were not as severe as in 
construction. In contrast, growth rates for employment in retail trade and retail services hardly 
differed between bubble and other metros, contrary to what would be expected if local aspects of the 
wealth effect contributed importantly to the slowdown.  
Unemployment data show who was most affected by the declining labor market. As shown in Figure 5, 
the unemployment rate fell between 2005 and 2006 in bubble metros for virtually all groups shown --  
then rose significantly in 2007 and again in 2008. In other metros, unemployment rates largely held 
                                                 
22 Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008) found that lending standards declined particularly in markets 
with larger home price increases. Mayer and Pence (2008) also find some evidence of this, but they also 
note that some markets with housing booms did not see large increases in subprime lending, such as 
the Northeast.  
23 Also around this time was the beginning of the run-up in energy prices, which may have affected 
housing costs of homeowners more than those of renters.  - 11 -  
 
steady or continued to come down over the whole 2005-08 period.
24 Taken together with the data on 
employment changes, these results suggest that the decline in real economic activity that eventually 
became a recession originated in metropolitan areas where housing-price bubbles had burst.
25 Within 
bubble MSAs, we see a pattern often found in aggregate contractions: increases in unemployment rates 
were larger for workers who had not completed their high school diplomas than they were for those 
who had, and in turn increases were larger for those with high school diplomas than they were for 
college graduates. Similarly, increases were larger for black workers than for Hispanic workers, which 
were in turn larger than those for non-Hispanic whites. These results are consistent with much previous 
research finding that aggregate downturns have particularly detrimental effects on employment and 
incomes for less-educated workers and minorities (Blank 1989, Hoynes 2000, Spriggs and Williams 2000, 
Cherry and Rodgers 2000).  
Homeownership 
According to estimates from the Current Population Survey, the overall U.S. homeownership rate 
increased from 64% in 1994 to a historic high of 69% in 2004, then fell back to 67.8% by 2008; in 
metropolitan areas, the rate peaked at 67.4% in 2005-2006 then slipped to 66.4% by 2008.
26 As shown in 
Table 2, the ACS data for metros with populations of 250,000 or more show slightly different trends, 
with mean and median homeownership rates not peaking until 2007. The bursting of the housing-price 
bubble would lead us to expect homeownership to fall by more in bubble metros than elsewhere, as 
falling prices reduce prospective owners’ incentives to shift from renting to owning and existing 
owners’ incentives to move to better homes -- instead creating incentives to postpone such transitions 
until prices ‘bottom out’. Additionally, bubble areas would be expected to have a higher incidence of 
departures from financially unsustainable homeownership arrangements. The ACS data show that 
indeed the 2007-08 decline in homeownership was larger in bubble metros than elsewhere. The 
average homeownership rate came down by 1.1 percentage points in bubble metros, but only 0.5 
percentage points elsewhere. The median decline was 1.4 percentage points in bubble metros, versus 
0.5 percentage points elsewhere. Still, this difference between the two types of metros is relatively 
modest, and the fact that homeownership also fell in ‘regular’ MSAs suggests that other factors 
independent of local housing-market conditions were shifting interest in it –- such as rising mortgage 
interest rates, tightening of lending standards, and/or dissipation of the popular narrative that 
homeownership is always and everywhere a wonderful investment (Shiller 2007).
27 
                                                 
24 For comparison, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ monthly household survey show the civilian 
unemployment rate rising after March 2007.  
25 In December 2008, the National Bureau of Economic Research declared that had recession had 
started in December 2007. 
26 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08ind.html 
27 Note that this is also consistent with several studies finding that in the years before the bubble 
burst, housing-market dynamics were increasingly governed by common aggregate factors, rather than - 12 -  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, declines in homeownership rates did not differ markedly across households with 
differing characteristics: for most types of households in bubble metros, the rate declined by about 1-
1.5 percentage points, while it fell by around 0.5 percentage point for most types of households in 
other MSAs. However, more pronounced declines occurred for two specific groups. In bubble MSAs, 
homeownership rates fell more steeply for black and Hispanic households than others –- a finding which 
is consistent with other studies finding subprime lending to have been concentrated in areas that 
experienced bubbles and that had relatively large black and Hispanic populations (e.g. Mayer and 
Pence 2008).
28 In regular MSAs, there were significant and relatively large declines in mean and median 
homeownership among households where the householder had less than a high school education. While 
the explanation of this is at present unclear, it is consistent with other evidence in the ACS data of 
deteriorating circumstances for this group (see below).  
Poverty and inequality 
 
Table 3 and Figure 6 show results from the ACS on poverty. Whereas poverty rates were flat in regular 
MSAs, they rose in metros with bubbles. In terms of differences across households, the data do not 
show clear trends, possibly in line with previous research finding that poverty rates do not co-move as 
closely with aggregate economic conditions as one might expect (e.g. Hoover, Enders, and Freeman 
2008). Focusing on changes in bubble MSAs, between 2007 and 2008 the poverty rate rose by about 1 
percentage point for almost all groups, although it held steady for families where the householder was 
black. In other MSAs, the poverty rate for households where the householder had less than a high 
school education moved steadily and significantly upward from 2005 to 2008. While it is unclear what 
the cause of this is, along with rising unemployment and declining homeownership, it suggests some 
fundamental erosion in livelihoods for this group.  
 
Table 3 also shows results for measures of income inequality available in the ACS: the shares of income 
going to the top 25% and the top 5% and the Gini coefficient. All three measures rose between 2006 
and 2008 in regular MSAs, whereas they were flat in those with bubbles. Evidence of flattening is 
consistent with the Census Bureau’s annual estimates of income inequality from the Current Population 
Survey, which show the income share of the top quintile and the Gini coefficient having plateaued in 
2006.
29 In future work, we plan to examine whether trends like the decline in FIRE employment and 
incomes contributed to this.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
regional or local variables, suggesting an importance of credit-market changes or other national-level 
factors (see e.g. Fu 2007 and  Del Negro and 2007). 
28 See Coleman, LaCour-Little, and Vandell (2008) on the difficulty of establishing directions of 
causalities between housing prices and subprime lending.  
29 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1968 to 2009 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/IE-1.pdf - 13 -  
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
To summarize, this study has six key findings with respect to the distributional effects of the housing-
price slump up through 2008. First, in metropolitan areas where housing price bubbles burst, prices 
slumped somewhat more on the lower-end of the home-price distribution than at the upper-end. 
Second, declining housing prices have not lowered housing costs for renters in a broad-based way. 
Third, 2006-07 saw substantial declines in construction and FIRE employment in metropolitan areas 
where housing-price bubbles had burst -- consistent with Case and Quigley’s prediction that the most 
powerful mechanism transmitting effects to the broader economy would be the income and 
employment channel. Fourth, increases in unemployment rates in metros where bubbles burst were 
most pronounced among households with less education and/or minorities, as is usual in aggregate 
downturns. Fifth, while homeownership rates have slipped everywhere, some of the largest decreases 
occurred for black and Hispanic households in metros where bubbles had burst. Finally, poverty rates 
increased in bubble metros between 2007 and 2008, while holding steady elsewhere; although trends 
across groups are not clear cut, the rate may have risen differentially for households of Hispanic origin.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that declines in key elements of economic well-being have been 
concentrated among those without good resources for withstanding financial distress. An important 
implication from a monetary-policy perspective is that the risks of failing to check a housing-price 
bubble as it is forming are asymmetrically distributed: if the bubble subsequently bursts, adverse 
effects fall on a wide range of households, with the most costly and difficult ones (job loss, a spell in 
poverty, significant troubles with creditors, loss of a home, etc.) tending to fall on people whose 
economic lives and material living standards are anyway less secure. While it can be argued that 
several elements of the present housing-price bust are unusual and unlikely to be repeated (notably, 
the extraordinary relaxation of lending standards associated with subprime mortgages), other cases 
when booms and busts in home prices have been associated with aggregate fluctuations are not 
difficult to find, as when the ‘credit crunch’ that followed the 1980s real-estate booms on both coasts 
contributed to the 1990-91 recession (Bernanke and Loan 1991). The present paper underlines the 
importance of incorporating concerns with misalignments in asset prices into the modus operandi of 
monetary policy, whether by interest rates (Taylor 2007) or some other means (Brunnermeier, 

























Bubble  36 292.2 -27.7 23 309.5  -33.7 
Non-bubble  131 182.7  -2.0  144 186.0  -2.4 
 
 
Source: FHFA all-transaction home price indexes. - 15 -  
 
 
Table 2. Homeownership rates 
  
Regular MSAs  Bubble MSAs 
  













mean 68.1  68.4  68.6  68.0  -0.5* 0.00 65.7  66.1  65.8  65.0  -1.1*  0.002 
median  68.2 69.0  69.1  68.6  -0.5  0.64  65.8 66.3  67.1  65.7  -1.4* 0.018 
By education 
of householder 
                      
Less than HS 
diploma 
mean 55.8  55.3  54.8  52.5  -3.2* 0.000 52.1 52.4  51.7  50.6  -1.7*  0.000 
median 55.9  55.8 54.7 53.2  -2.7* 0.010 49.7 50.5  49.3  50.3 -0.2 0.105 
HS diploma 
mean  65.9 66.0  65.9  65.6 -0.4* 0.012 63.9 64.2  63.9  63.0  -1.3* 0.000 
median  66.4 66.6  66.1  66.1  -0.5  0.161 63.4 63.6  64.1  62.0 -2.1 0.105 
College degree 
mean  78.1 78.8  79.4  78.7 -0.7* 0.012 77.6 77.1  76.9  76.1  -1.5* 0.000 




                      
Non-Hispanic 
white 
mean  73.9 74.2  74.3  73.8 -0.5* 0.001 72.1 72.1  71.5  71.3  -0.8* 0.051 
median  74.5 74.6  74.6  74.0  -0.7  0.350 72.2 71.8  72.7  71.3 -1.4 0.376 
Black 
mean  41.6 43.0  43.3  42.8  -0.5  0.514 44.1 44.3  44.5  42.4  -2.2+  0.096 
median  43.0 43.4  44.1  43.4  -0.7  0.947 43.5 45.0  46.4  41.2 -5.2 0.210 
Hispanic 
mean   44.7 44.6  46.3  46.1  -0.2  0.766 51.0 52.4  53.1  51.7  -1.3* 0.042 




For mean, p-value comes from regressions. For median, continuity-corrected Pearson Chi-square test. [k-sample equality of medians test] 
 - 16 -  
 
 
Table 3. Measures of poverty and inequality 
   Regular MSAs  Bubble MSAs    
  




























Mean 13.3  13.1  13.2  -0.083  0.48  12.3 11.9  12.7  0.4+  0.069  0.5* 0.052 
Median 12.8  12.8  12.8 -0.036  1.000  11.4 11.1  12.4  1.0  0.239    
Share of HHs 
receiving cash 
assistance 
Mean 9.5  9.2 9.9  0.403*  0.041  6.4 5.9  7.1  0.7*  0.001  0.3 0.272 
Median 8.6  8.7  9.6  0.993  0.138  5.7 5.5  6.5  0.8  0.239    
Measures of 
inequality 
                    
% of income 
going to top 
25% of HHs 
Mean 48.2  48.4  48.5 0.3*  0.000  48.7 48.9  48.8  0.1  0.720  -0.2 0.376 
Median 48.2  48.5  48.4  0.2  0.711  48.7 48.7  48.4  -0.4  0.480    
% of income 
going to top 5% 
of HHs 
Mean 20.6  20.9  21.1 0.4*  0.000  21.3 21.7  21.3  0.0  0.920  -0.4 0.223 
Median 20.6  20.8  21.0  0.4+  0.084  21.0 21.0  20.7  -0.4  0.814    
Gini coefficient 
Mean 0.446  0.448  0.449  0.003*  0.000  0.448 0.450  0.450  0.001  0.578  -0.002 0.492 
Median 0.445 0.448 0.448  0.003  0.458  0.448 0.451  0.445  -0.003  0.814    - 17 -  
 
 
Figure 1. Housing market characteristics 







Regular MSAs Bubble MSAs









Regular MSAs Bubble MSAs
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Share of households living in the same place as last 











Regular MSAs Bubble MSAs










Regular MSAs Bubble MSAs
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
* Excludes New Orleans. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of home prices 
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Figure 3. Housing finances 
Share of homeowners w/ housing costs exceeding 
30% of their income 
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Figure 4. Year-over-year percent change in employment 
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Figure 5. Unemployment by education and by race/ethncity 
By education  By race/ethnicity 
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Figure 6. Poverty rates by education and race/ethnicity 
By education  By race/ethnicity 
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Appendix Table 1. Estimates of the housing-wealth effect 














what was lost 




































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
200601  13463.5                  
200602  13190.8 ‐ 272.8 ‐ 5.5  101.8 ‐ 5.4  9035.0  9040.4  2.6  2.7 ‐ 0.1 
200603  12983.6 ‐ 207.2 ‐ 15.1  102.6 ‐ 14.7  9090.7  9105.4  2.5  2.7 ‐ 0.2 
200604  13117.2  133.6 ‐ 19.3  103.3 ‐ 18.6  9181.6  9200.2  3.3  3.5 ‐ 0.2 
200701  12472.0 ‐ 645.2 ‐ 34.3  103.3 ‐ 33.2  9265.1  9298.3  3.1  3.5 ‐ 0.4 
200702  11946.1 ‐ 525.9 ‐ 61.2  104.3 ‐ 58.7  9291.5  9350.2  2.8  3.4 ‐ 0.6 
200703  11231.2 ‐ 714.9 ‐ 94.5  105.1 ‐ 90.0  9335.6  9425.6  2.7  3.5 ‐ 0.8 
200704  10492.8 ‐ 738.4 ‐ 135.8  105.7 ‐ 128.5  9363.6  9492.1  2.0  3.2 ‐ 1.2 
200801  9384.6 ‐ 1108.2 ‐ 192.1  107.0 ‐ 179.5  9349.6  9529.1  0.9  2.5 ‐ 1.6 
200802  8520.3 ‐ 864.3 ‐ 232.8  108.0 ‐ 215.6  9351.0  9566.6  0.6  2.3 ‐ 1.7 
200803  7656.0 ‐ 864.2 ‐ 280.7  109.0 ‐ 257.5  9267.7  9525.2 ‐ 0.7  1.1 ‐ 1.8 
200804  6607.4 ‐ 1048.6 ‐ 363.2  110.3 ‐ 329.4  9195.3  9524.7 ‐ 1.8  0.3 ‐ 2.1 
200901  5256.8 ‐ 1350.6 ‐ 394.8  108.9 ‐ 362.7  9209.2  9571.9 ‐ 1.5  0.4 ‐ 2.0 
200902  5795.4  538.6 ‐ 416.7  108.4 ‐ 384.2  9189.0  9573.2 ‐ 1.7  0.1 ‐ 1.8 
200903  6213.3  417.9 ‐ 401.3  108.8 ‐ 368.8  9256.0  9624.8 ‐ 0.1  1.0 ‐ 1.2 
Assumed effects by quarter are Q1: .02, Q2: .04, Q3: .05, Q4: .06, Q5: .07, Q6: .075. Q7: .078, Q8: .08 - 27 -  
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Appendix Table 2. Categorization of MSAs by bubble definitions 




from peak thru 
2008:Q4 
Metros classified as having bubbles under both  
narrow and broad definitions 
  
Bakersfield, CA  280.4  -35.8 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL  308.3  -43.5 
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL  291.7  -25.3 
Fresno, CA  286.2  -32.6 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  258.5  -37.1 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA    338.4  -24.0 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL    332.9  -28.9 
Modesto, CA  312.3  -49.4 
Naples-Marco Island, FL  370.1  -41.9 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA  325.4  -29.2 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL  279.5  -31.1 
Port St. Lucie, FL  292.7  -33.7 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  332.7  -40.1 
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA  291.3  -34.1 
Salinas, CA  356.6  -43.5 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA  322.4  -26.0 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA    313.2  -20.4 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA  346.9  -31.4 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA  302.1  -27.6 
Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL  309.5  -35.9 
Stockton, CA  308.7  -51.7 
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA  314.8  -42.8 
Visalia-Porterville, CA  252.6  -27.8 
Metros classified as having bubbles under the broad 
definition only 
  
Jacksonville, FL  270.5  -12.0 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL  256.1  -17.2 
Ocala, FL  271.3  -17.6 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL  284.5  -21.9 
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL  230.8  -14.2 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  295.6  -22.4 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA  259.0  -11.0 
Reno-Sparks, NV  252.0  -24.9 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  315.7  -14.7 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  291.3  -23.3 
Tucson, AZ  242.6  -12.2 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV    277.7  -14.6 
Worcester, MA  246.1  -10.3 
Metros without bubbles    
Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC  274.5  -2.7 
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ  274.3  -7.4 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  Metro Area  262.8  -5.0 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC  259.0  -3.0 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  257.6  -5.8 
Manchester-Nashua, NH  254.4  -7.5 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY  254.2  -9.3 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA  246.6  -5.2 
Asheville, NC  246.6  -0.2 
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME  246.4  -2.9 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT  243.3  -6.9 
Wilmington, NC  242.9  -4.8 
Duluth, MN-WI  242.6  -0.5 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH  238.0  -6.8 
New York Metro Area  238.0  -6.8 - 29 -  
 
Savannah, GA  236.1  -1.3 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  234.8  -8.7 
Trenton-Ewing, NJ  234.8  -7.4 
Norwich-New London, CT  227.8  -4.7 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD  Metro 
Area 
225.3 -2.9 
Eugene-Springfield, OR  224.1  -3.2 
Richmond, VA  224.0  -2.1 
New Haven-Milford, CT  223.5  -6.1 
Tallahassee, FL  222.3  -6.1 
Salt Lake City, UT  221.9  -3.4 
Boise City-Nampa, ID  217.5  -6.1 
Salem, OR  217.1  -2.4 
Springfield, MA  212.7  -5.8 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  211.1  -1.4 
Boulder, CO /1  208.5  0.0 
Provo-Orem, UT  207.4  -4.7 
Austin-Round Rock, TX  207.2  -0.1 
Anchorage, AK  205.7  -0.4 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ  204.7  -4.4 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  203.5  -2.2 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT  201.1  -3.2 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI  201.0  -4.1 
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA  200.4  0.0 
Denver-Aurora, CO /1  200.3  -1.4 
Spokane, WA  200.2  -1.3 
Roanoke, VA  199.2  0.0 
Mobile, AL  199.1  -3.7 
Honolulu, HI  198.4  -3.6 
Ogden-Clearfield, UT  195.2  -1.5 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI  194.4  -2.4 
York-Hanover, PA  193.8  -1.5 
Baton Rouge, LA  193.6  -0.7 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN  193.4  0.0 
St. Louis, MO-IL  192.2  -1.2 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX  191.0  0.0 
Madison, WI  190.2  -1.2 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA  189.8  0.0 
Jackson, MS  189.0  -10.3 
Ann Arbor, MI  188.4  -16.8 
Colorado Springs, CO  188.2  -2.6 
Columbus, GA-AL  188.1  -1.7 
Knoxville, TN  187.4  0.0 
Lancaster, PA  186.4  -1.0 
Reading, PA  186.0  -3.7 
Chattanooga, TN-GA  185.9  -3.0 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA  185.6  -4.1 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO  185.4  -0.6 
Albuquerque, NM  185.4  -2.6 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI  184.7  -22.5 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC  184.3  -0.4 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO  182.7  -3.9 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC  182.3  -2.2 
Kansas City, MO-KS  182.0  -2.9 
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA  181.9  0.0 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL  181.7  -0.9 
Oklahoma City, OK  180.7  -1.8 
El Paso, TX  180.5  -2.5 
Durham, NC  179.9  0.0 
San Antonio, TX  179.3  -1.8 
Lexington-Fayette, KY  178.7  -1.5 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL  178.0  -0.7 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA  177.9  -1.8 - 30 -  
 
Columbia, SC  177.7  0.0 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX  177.4  0.0 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI  177.3  -9.3 
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC  176.7  -1.3 
Corpus Christi, TX  175.9  0.0 
Huntsville, AL  175.2  0.0 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN  174.1  -0.6 
Flint, MI  173.9  -18.1 
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH  173.5  -1.3 
Raleigh-Cary, NC  173.4  0.0 
Utica-Rome, NY  172.9  -4.9 
Tulsa, OK  172.4  -1.2 
Peoria, IL  171.5  -1.1 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA  171.2  -1.5 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR  171.1  0.0 
Green Bay, WI  171.0  -1.7 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI  170.3  -5.6 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA  170.0  -1.5 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI  169.3  -7.6 
Fort Smith, AR-OK  168.8  -1.1 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  167.8  0.0 
Pittsburgh, PA  167.7  -0.6 
Syracuse, NY  166.5  -1.8 
Evansville, IN-KY  166.2  -3.4 
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX  164.2  0.0 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI  164.0  -1.8 
Toledo, OH  163.5  -7.3 
Montgomery, AL  163.4  0.0 
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC  163.0  -1.8 
Lincoln, NE  162.4  -1.3 
Charleston, WV  162.0  -1.6 
Spartanburg, SC  161.3  -4.5 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN  160.8  -2.6 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR  160.6  -3.4 
Wichita, KS  160.5  0.0 
Springfield, MO  160.2  -2.3 
Winston-Salem, NC  159.7  -1.2 
Lubbock, TX  Metro Area  159.6  0.0 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX  159.4  -3.0 
Columbus, OH  159.2  -1.6 
Rockford, IL  158.7  -2.0 
Greensboro-High Point, NC  158.5  -1.6 
Canton-Massillon, OH  157.4  -4.8 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA  157.0  -3.2 
Fayetteville, NC  155.9  -1.9 
Akron, OH  154.9  -6.6 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX  152.9  -2.8 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  151.8  -6.7 
Erie, PA  151.3  -2.8 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN  150.8  -2.1 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY  149.5  -0.5 
Fort Wayne, IN  143.0  -1.4 
Dayton, OH  142.4  -2.6 
Rochester, NY  142.0  -0.2 
    
 